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Regulatory Cooperation and Foreign Portfolio Investment 
     
 
Abstract: We investigate the effect of cross-border regulatory cooperation on global mutual fund 
portfolio allocations, focusing on the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU), a 
non-binding information sharing arrangement between global securities regulators. Connections 
between the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other foreign regulators increase 
the SEC’s ability to pursue US cross-listed firms. We find that foreign investment in US-cross-
listed firms domiciled in the signatory country increases significantly relative to non-cross-listed 
firms from that country. We find the strongest effects of the MMoU for non-US investors trading 
on non-US exchanges, which suggests that there are significant spillover effects associated with 
regulatory cooperation. This increase in foreign investment is particularly pronounced for 
investors from geographically, linguistically, and culturally distant countries where information 
asymmetry is high, and also for dedicated investors who are more reliant on public information 
and oversight. Consistent with the increased US regulatory oversight driving the results, the 
increase in foreign investment is concentrated among US-cross-listed firms that are SEC 
registrants, firms from countries that had weak prior regulatory links to the US, and firms from 
investor countries that are closely aligned with the US.  
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1. Introduction  
In countries where domestic sources of funding are limited, foreign portfolio investment is 
an important source of outside financing (Bekaert et al. 2002). However, aspects of a country's 
institutional infrastructure, such as limited regulatory oversight and weak shareholder protection, 
can limit foreign investment in many countries (Leuz et al. 2008). One potential approach that 
firms can use to overcome these investment barriers is to commit to stricter monitoring by cross-
listing on a securities exchange in a country with greater regulatory oversight, such as the United 
States (Karolyi 2006, 2012). However, the effectiveness of such regulatory bonding depends, in 
large part, on the willingness of regulators in the firm’s home country to cooperate with foreign 
regulators. In particular, it has historically been very difficult for a regulator such as the SEC to 
access information and enforce US securities laws in foreign countries (even for cross-listed firms) 
because the SEC’s effective jurisdiction is largely limited to the US (e.g., Siegel, 2005; Silvers 
2017a). As a result, overcoming structural impediments to foreign investment through cross-listing 
does not generally yield SEC oversight that is comparable to domestic securities.  
Increasingly, the SEC and other regulators have sought to use cooperative information-
sharing agreements with foreign regulators, such as memoranda of understanding (MOUs), to 
overcome obstacles to cross-border oversight. MOUs are particularly interesting because they are 
neither treaties nor formal regulatory agreements, but rather are “soft law” indicating an intent to 
cooperate.1 The events of September 11, 2001 accelerated efforts of the International Organization 
of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) to create a mechanism for information-sharing and 
enforcement cooperation between securities regulators across countries. The result was IOSCO’s 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU), which comprises the most comprehensive 
																																								 																				
1 MOUs have been used to facilitate cooperation in a wide range of settings including climate change, labor relations, 
nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missiles limitation, extradition, refugee settlement, and aircraft hijacking.  
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2 
and rigorous standards of information sharing and cooperation to date. The US was among the first 
countries to sign the MMoU (in 2002), with over one hundred other countries joining from 2002 
to 2017. Once a regulator has qualified for and signed the MMoU, it has the right to request 
information and cooperation from the other countries in the MMoU network. As a result, foreign 
regulators from countries signing the MMoU after the U.S. signed in 2002 committed themselves 
to providing information to and cooperation with (among others) the US’s SEC.  
We have two primary goals in this paper. First, we use the staggered adoption of the MMoU 
to assess the impact of cooperative regulatory agreements on foreign portfolio investment. A 
primary objective of the MMoU is to enhance investors’ confidence in cross-border regulatory 
oversight. To the extent that investors perceive the MMoU as enhancing oversight, we expect it to 
influence their willingness to make cross-border investments. Our second goal is to use detailed 
data on changes in global mutual fund portfolio allocations to investigate who is motivated to 
increase their investment positions in firms affected by the MMoU—based on characteristics of 
the signing country, the fund country, the type of investor, the stock exchange, and the target firm. 
In particular, MMoU oversight constitutes a public good in the sense that, while the primary 
mandate of the SEC is to protect US investors and exchanges, the benefits of incremental oversight 
are non-excludable (other investors and exchanges are not excluded from any benefits) and non-
rivalrous (use by one party does not reduce availability to others). As a result, the changes in 
investment motivated by the increased protections derived from the MMoU could accrue to a wide 
range of investors and exchanges—not only US investors or exchanges. By examining changes in 
the mix of investors and their choice of trading venue, we can explore the potential spillovers from 
SEC oversight for non-US investors in non-US stocks trading on non-US markets.  
From a research design perspective, the MMoU provides a powerful setting to identify the 
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3 
effects of cooperative regulatory agreements on foreign investment and the incidence of any 
regulatory spillovers. Because we expect SEC enforcement efforts to focus on US-cross-listed 
firms, we can better isolate the effect of the MMoU by comparing changes in foreign ownership 
in US-cross-listed firms to the total ownership (of all firms) by the same funds in the same country. 
The within-country comparison between cross-listed (treated) and domestic-listed (control) stocks 
effectively controls for a wide range of other factors that could affect institutional investment 
including macroeconomic shocks, investor preferences, and other changes in regulation at the 
country level. Additionally, the MMoU adoption dates are staggered, which permits us to better 
isolate the effect of adopting the MMoU from other changes in investor preferences.  
Looking first at whether the adoption of the MMoU affects institutional investment in 
general, we document a statistically and economically significant 5.4 percentage point increase in 
the tilt of funds’ holdings toward US-cross-listed firms; that is, a tilt towards US-cross-listed firms 
domiciled in MMoU-signing countries relative to non-US-cross-listed firms in the same country. 
Funds appear to increase both their existing holdings in cross-listed firms (i.e., the intensive 
margin) as well as the number of cross-listed stocks in which they invest (i.e., the extensive 
margin). We assess the reasonableness of the parallel trends assumption by plotting the MMoU 
treatment effect in event time, and find that none of the counterfactual treatment effects are 
statistically different from zero, while after the signing of the MMoU, the coefficient estimate is 
positive and significant. 
Having documented that institutional investors appear to respond to a country’s signing of 
the MMoU, the remainder of our analyses examine cross-sectional variation in this response. These 
analyses serve (at least) two purposes: First, to the extent that results are strongest where predicted, 
they provide further confidence that we can attribute the earlier results to the MMoU. Second, and 
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more importantly from the standpoint of regulators and other market participants, our analysis 
assists in identifying the parties who derive the most value from the additional oversight provided 
by the MMoU.2  
We begin by separately examining the effect of the MMoU on local and foreign 
institutions. We predict that, absent oversight, foreign institutions are likely to be at an inherent 
information disadvantage relative to local institutions and, therefore, stand to benefit more from 
the enhanced external oversight associated with the MMoU.3 Consistent with this prediction, we 
find that the observed increase in investment after the MMoU is driven by foreign institutions. The 
point estimate for investment by domestic institutions is negative suggesting that, if anything, there 
may be a substitution from (better informed) domestic investors to (less informed) foreign 
institutions following the signing of the MMoU. 
In our next set of analyses, we further split foreign institutions based on whether they are 
based in the US or in other countries.  While the primary mandate of the SEC is to protect US 
investors, there are several reasons to believe that non-US investors may be primary beneficiaries 
of enhanced SEC oversight. Prior research documents that because of their scale, resources, and 
substantial research capacity, US institutional investors tend to have an informational advantage 
relative to other foreign investors (e.g., Albuquerque et al. 2009; Ferreira et al. 2017). Furthermore, 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not apply to foreign investors trading foreign securities 
on foreign exchanges (“f-cubed” cases), even if the shares are cross-listed in the US. Because US 
institutions are more likely to hold cross-listed shares in the US, they will naturally have stronger 
																																								 																				
2 We use the terms “value” and “benefit” for parsimony to indicate the revealed preferences of investors as reflected 
by increases in their portfolio holdings. For example, if foreign investors increase their portfolio tilt toward US-cross-
listed stocks relative to local investors following the MMoU signing, we interpret that as evidence that foreign 
investors value (benefit from) the enhanced oversight associated with the MMoU more highly than do local investors.  
3 We refer to “information” disadvantage, but the issue is likely to include not only access to firm-specific information, 
but also familiarity with and access to the legal system, cultural norms and other country-level institutions. 
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5 
legal protection in general, so the incremental MMoU effect will be less pronounced.4 The fact 
that US investors have preexisting information and legal advantages relative to non-US investors 
in cross-listed firms suggests that the incremental benefits of the MMoU could be larger for non-
US investors.  To the extent that non-US investors are primary beneficiaries of the additional 
oversight associated with the MMoU, it suggests significant spillover effects of SEC monitoring.   
Separating foreign investment into US and non-US investment, we find that non-US 
investment in US-cross-listed firms increased by 6.8 percentage points after the signing of the 
MMoU. The change in investment by US investors is positive (2.4 percentage points) but not 
statistically significant, and the difference between US funds and non-US funds is significant, 
suggesting that non-US investors are the primary beneficiaries of the increase in SEC oversight 
accompanying the MMoU.  To further explore the spillover effect of SEC oversight on non-US 
investors, we examine changes in the magnitude of the MMoU effect around the Supreme Court 
decision in Morrison vs. National Australia Bank (Morrison), which substantially limited the legal 
rights of non-US investors in US courts. If the stronger result for non-US investors reflects the 
limited access of non-US investors to the US legal system, the MMOU effect should become 
stronger for non-US investors following Morrison (i.e., public oversight becomes more important 
because private legal action is limited). Results splitting pre- and post-Morrison are consistent with 
predictions; the MMoU effect is evident in both sub-periods but is significantly stronger post-
Morrison. 
To further assess the benefits associated with the MMoU for non-US investors, we split the 
sample based on attributes of the investor/investee country-pair and the investment strategy of the 
																																								 																				
4 In particular, there is likely a substitution effect between public oversight and private access to legal recourse. To 
the extent that US investors are better protected by the US legal system relative to foreign investors, they are likely to 
be less reliant on firm-level oversight.  
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6 
institutional investor. In particular, if the increase in holdings by non-US foreign institutions reflects 
a decrease in information asymmetry, we would expect it to vary cross-sectionally based on the 
extent of the information disadvantage between the foreign investor and the target (Choe et al. 
2005). To examine this prediction, we compare the size of the MMoU effect across different 
investor country/target country pairs. Consistent with the MMoU reducing the relative information 
disadvantage faced by foreign investors, we find that foreign institutions more likely to suffer from 
the greatest information asymmetry with respect to the investee country (as captured by the two 
countries: being geographically farther apart, having different languages, not having a historic 
colonial connection, and having a high degree of distrust), place more value on the additional 
oversight associated with the MMoU. 
If the information effect of the MMoU is an important determinant of institutions’ 
responses, we would also expect it to be larger for foreign institutions more reliant on information 
and ongoing governance oversight. Following research such as Borochin and Yang (2017), which 
suggests that dedicated investors with longer investment horizons are attracted to firms with better 
transparency and governance, we predict that dedicated (i.e., long-term) investors will increase their 
holdings more in response to the MMoU relative to transient (i.e., short-term) investors. Consistent 
with this prediction, we find that the increase in ownership for dedicated investors is more than 
twice as large as the increase by transient investors.  
In our next set of analyses, we investigate variation in the effect of the MMoU based on the 
extent of SEC involvement. Because the SEC has limited jurisdiction over unregistered US listings, 
we expect that if the increase in US oversight is the reason non-US foreign investors increase their 
holdings, it should be concentrated in firms that are directly subject to SEC oversight.5 Consistent 
																																								 																				
5 This analysis also has the advantage of implicitly controlling for other factors that might shift institutional investor 
interest to US-traded firms more generally. For example, if the increase in holdings of US cross-listed firms reflects a 
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with SEC oversight being a primary driver of the investor response to the MMoU, we find evidence 
of a significant increase in non-US foreign ownership of SEC-registered ADRs but no evidence of 
an increase in ownership of non-registered ADRs.  
Similarly, if the SEC’s involvement is an important determinant of the impact of the MMoU, 
we expect that for countries with weak economic ties to the US and no preexisting bilateral 
cooperation agreements with the SEC, the incremental oversight associated with the MMoU should 
be more pronounced. Splitting countries based on preexisting ties to the US, we find that the effect 
of the MMoU was particularly pronounced for signatory (i.e., investee) countries without an 
existing working relationship with the SEC and with weak economic ties to the US. 
Relatedly, non-US investors likely differ in the extent to which they are aware of, and 
confident in, the efficacy of the US government in general and the SEC in particular, which could 
result in variation in investor-countries’ responses to the MMoU. We find that, following adoption, 
the tilt toward U.S. cross-listed firms by non-U.S. foreign investors is weaker for those more 
distantly linked to the US in terms of UN voting and political systems. 
The preceding analyses suggest that the effect of the MMoU is most pronounced for non-
US investors facing high information asymmetry with previously limited access to SEC oversight 
and enforcement.  In our final set of analyses, we investigate whether the increased foreign non-
US ownership occurs primarily on the US exchanges or in the firm’s domestic market.  In 
particular, increasing non-US ownership in U.S. ADRs could lead to increased holdings that could 
occur in US or foreign exchanges. Whether an investor chooses to hold shares in the underlying 
security on the firm’s home market or in the ADR depends on the tradeoff between the likely lower 
transactions costs, reduced taxation, and currency risk of the home market relative to the enhanced 
																																								 																				
preference for US-listed stocks unrelated to the MMoU, we should observe the effect for US cross-listed stocks 
irrespective of SEC registrant status.  
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protection of the US legal system provided by the ADR. To the extent that the MMoU increases 
public oversight and hence reduces the importance of the private right to legal action, we would 
also expect it to increase the relative attractiveness of trading shares on the firm’s local market. 
Consistent with this prediction, we find that the majority of the increase in holdings by non-US 
foreign institutions occurs in the underlying shares traded on the firm’s home exchange rather than 
in the cross-listed shares traded via an ADR in the US. Coupled with the preceding result, this 
suggests that the effects of the increase in SEC oversight accompanying the MMoU occur 
primarily outside US markets. Taken as a whole, our results provide evidence of a significant 
regulatory spillover in the sense that the efforts of a US regulator (the SEC) appear to primarily 
affect non-US investors trading non-US stocks on non-US exchanges. 
Our findings make several important contributions to the literature. First, we provide, to our 
knowledge, the first evidence of cross-border spillovers from increased regulatory cooperation and 
information sharing. As noted in Leuz and Wysocki (2016), the literature lacks evidence on 
“market- or economy-wide effects from regulation, such as externalities, information spillovers 
and/or network effects.” While the traditional mandate of a regulator such as the SEC is to protect 
US investors and oversee US exchanges, our evidence suggests that networks of cooperative 
regulatory agreements, which increase US oversight abroad, can have substantial spillover effects 
for non-US investors, non-US firms, and non-US exchanges. 
Second, we provide novel evidence on the effects of the MMoU on the geographic mix of 
a firm’s investors. Given the importance of foreign capital in economic growth and development, 
it is important to understand the extent to which changes in regulatory oversight affect an investor’s 
willingness to invest abroad. We provide evidence that the MMoU affected foreign investors’ 
preferences for firms, subject to increased regulatory oversight—and particularly the preferences 
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of those investors facing a significant information disadvantage.  
Third, we provide evidence on the effects of legal bonding by cross-listing. Prior research 
debates the extent to which the benefits associated with cross-listing result primarily from increased 
regulatory oversight. Disentangling oversight effects is notoriously difficult given endogeneity in 
the choice and timing of cross-listing (e.g., Hail and Leuz, 2006) and limitations on the ability of 
the SEC to gather information and enforce US securities laws for non-US firms (Siegel, 2005). The 
MMoU provides a context in which oversight changes, while potential confounding factors such as 
firm choice, trading venue, changes in expected growth, capital structure, and legal standing are 
held relatively constant. Our evidence suggests that significant regulatory effects are associated 
with cross-listing in the sense that increases in oversight are associated with significant increases 
in foreign investment in US-cross-listed firms.  
Overall, our evidence is particularly relevant as regulators and investors consider adopting 
and expanding information-sharing and cooperation arrangements (e.g., IOSCO is in the process of 
launching the Enhanced MMoU (EMMoU) to increase the powers of the MMoU).6 
2. Institutional Background and Prior Literature  
Our primary goal is to assess the impact of the MMoU on foreign portfolio investment.7 
The MMoU is an instrument designed to cultivate cooperation across different jurisdictions, and 
requires regulators to adhere to standards for cross-border cooperation. The framework was 
established in May 2002, and dictates information sharing obligations for signatory countries such 
as the extent of the information shared, the permissible uses of this information, and any 
subsequent confidentiality obligations.  
The MMoU has been more successful than previous attempts at achieving cross-border 
																																								 																				
6 See https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=emmou for further details. 
7 The discussion in this section draws on the history of the MMoU and findings presented in Silvers (2017a). 
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regulatory cooperation because it was made a priority by major economies and enjoyed support 
from a range of countries, reflecting the increased demand for information sharing following the 
major terror attacks of the early 2000’s. Prior to the MMoU, cross-country regulatory cooperation 
was limited to ad hoc investigations or support established through bilateral agreements. These 
approaches were fraught with difficulties and the progress they made in terms of expanding 
enforcement capacities was quite limited. The MMoU has been successful in remediating many of 
the shortcomings of previous efforts at regulatory cooperation.8  
For major economies, the signing of the MMoU began in 2002 and continued thereafter. 
Variation in the adoption timing reflects differences in a country’s process of deciding to 
participate, navigating legislative protocol, establishing required infrastructure, and obtaining 
IOSCO approval. Membership in the MMoU provides the right to vote within IOSCO (IOSCO 
2005), as well as being a factor in decision-making by the IMF and the Financial Stability Board. 
The SEC has participated actively in information sharing under the MMoU.9 Silvers 
(2017a,b) finds that the MMoU significantly increased cooperation among regulators, enforcement 
actions, and stock market liquidity. The types of enforcement cases most commonly pursued by 
the SEC under the MMoU include insider trading, financial reporting improprieties, and bribery 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Our goal is to understand whether investors perceive 
benefits from the enhanced regulatory oversight provided by the MMOU, and, more importantly, 
which investors and markets are most affected.  
Our focus on investors is important for several reasons. From the SEC’s perspective, given 
																																								 																				
8 Between 2003 and 2016 there have been more than 22,489 annual information requests between regulators under the 
MMoU (https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=mmou). 
9 In 2016 alone, the SEC reported that it made 1,027 requests for information from foreign regulators and received 
636 requests from foreign regulators.  Because the SEC does not report separate statistics for requests made under the 
MMoU versus other agreements or provide detail on specific information requests, we do not know what fraction of 
these requests were made pursuant to the MMoU. 
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that regulatory oversight is costly and the SEC’s mandate primarily pertains to US investors and 
exchanges, it is informative to understand whether the primary beneficiaries of their efforts under 
the MMoU are US investors and exchanges. From IOSCO’s perspective as a global regulator, it is 
important to understand the effectiveness of the network of MMoU signatories in influencing 
investor behavior and which investors and exchanges derive the greatest benefits. For local 
regulators who go through the costly vetting and other efforts required for membership, it is 
important to assess the extent to which signing the MMoU affects foreigners’ willingness to invest 
in their country. More generally, managers, investors, and local stock exchanges are likely to be 
interested in the effect of regulatory oversight on the mix of investors attracted to the firm.  
There is little existing research examining the effects of regulatory oversight on the global 
mix of investors in the firm. Ferreira and Matos (2008) examine the determinants of global 
institutional ownership and find, not surprisingly, that foreign holdings are higher for cross-listed 
firms.10 However, because firms self-select into cross-listing based on variables such as investor 
demand and growth options, and because many other factors are associated with cross-listing (such 
as the types of institutions that are permitted to invest in the stock), it is difficult to attribute the 
ownership structure of cross-listed firms to the effects of regulation. The MMoU represents a shock 
that is outside of the firm’s control and is therefore less susceptible to self-selection concerns. In 
addition, the MMoU setting allows us to better identify the effects of regulatory oversight on 
investor clienteles because it provides a within-country control group less likely to be affected by 
the change in oversight and because adoption dates are staggered across countries over time.  
Despite its importance in practice, we believe we are the first to examine regulatory 
																																								 																				
10 Several papers have investigated the effect of increased financial statement comparability associated with IFRS 
adoption on institutional ownership (e.g., DeFond et al. 2011; Yu and Wahid 2014; Florou and Pope 2012). The list 
of adoption dates reported in Table 1, Panel B provides no evidence of a correlation between the MMoU and IFRS 
adoption.  
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spillovers from the involvement of a foreign regulator in one country on investors in unaffiliated 
countries. The staggered adoption of the MMoU and its network effects provide an attractive 
setting to investigate such spillovers. Moreover, our investee-investor specific ownership data 
allow us to identify which types of investor and investee countries benefit most from such 
spillovers—holding constant the institutional investors’ portfolio holdings within a country, as 
well as attributes of the underlying firms (and, thus, any time-varying, firm-specific characteristics 
such as profitability, liquidity, and stock returns that could also potentially affect the mix of 
investors).  
3. Research Design 
3.1 The MMoU and Foreign Portfolio Investment 
In our primary analysis, we focus on the effect of the MMoU on investment in US-cross-
listed firms relative to non-cross-listed firms.11 We adopt this focus for several reasons. First, 
cooperative regulatory agreements are designed to facilitate cross-border investment. Cross-listed 
firms provide an obvious scenario in which the SEC has clear jurisdiction to pursue the type of 
cross-border enforcement actions that cooperation under the MMoU is designed to enhance.  
Second, foreign investors in cross-listed firms are likely to face a large information 
disadvantage relative to local investors in the domestic market (Choe et al. 2005), so additional 
oversight is particularly important. Similarly, once they invest, foreign investors face higher 
monitoring costs and hurdles to legal action relative to local investors who have better access to 
local legal resources and better understand the countries’ institutional environment and companies’ 
reporting activities. By increasing the capacity for cross-border oversight, cooperative regulatory 
																																								 																				
11 We use the terms “foreign” and “local” to refer to the location of the investor relative to the domicile of the firm. 
For example, a US institution investing in shares of an Italian-domiciled firm (whether investing in the cross-listed 
shares on the US market or in the Italian market) would be considered a foreign investor with respect to that firm.  
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agreements permit regulators to better oversee the activities of firms that trade on multiple markets.  
3.2 Identification Strategy in the MMoU Setting 
A challenge in a regulatory study such as ours is in separating investment changes 
associated with a preference for increased oversight from those driven by changes in economic 
conditions. In this regard, the MMoU setting has several advantages to help identify the ownership 
effects of cooperative regulatory agreements. Specifically, because we expect the effect of the 
MMoU to be strongest for US-cross-listed firms, firms from the same country without a US cross-
listing provide a natural control group for changes in foreign investors’ general preferences for a 
given country at a particular time.12 This permits within-country, within-investor comparison, 
which allows us to effectively control for country-level or investor-level effects which might be 
correlated with the signing of the MMoU; these effects might include institutional investment 
trends common to a particular country, macroeconomic shocks, and other contemporaneous 
country-level changes in regulation.  
While the staggered MMoU adoption assists in identification, it is important to rule out 
other factors (e.g., that the timing of the regulations’ implementation might be correlated with 
increases in investor interest in the signatory country for reasons such as economic growth or an 
improved political environment). The effect of country-wide variation is naturally controlled by 
the within-country design. Additionally, several other features of the MMoU setting help to 
mitigate this concern. First, countries signed on to the MMoU in a staggered fashion over more 
than a decade; the exact timing is largely driven by differences in countries’ protocols for 
navigating the legislative process, establishing the required infrastructure, and obtaining IOSCO 
																																								 																				
12 While within-country comparison of cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms implicitly controls for a wide range of 
other factors, it likely biases against detecting regulatory effects of the MMoU to the extent that there are potential 
spillover effects of oversight on non-cross-listed firms. Consequently, our results likely provide a lower bound for the 
overall effect of the MMoU. 
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approval. Thus, the specific timing of the completion of the process is unlikely to be in response 
to short-term changes in economic circumstances (Mulherin 2007). Second, our focus on foreign 
investment allows us to test a variety of cross-sectional predictions about the types of investor 
countries, investee countries, and firms most likely to be affected by the enhanced cross-border 
oversight. To the extent that the results from these cross-sectional comparisons are consistent with 
our predictions, they provide further support for our inferences and insight into the specific effects 
of the MMoU. Third, we can control for changes in other factors such as profitability, capital 
structure and liquidity for US-cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-listed firms to ensure that 
those factors do not drive our empirical results.  Finally, in our empirical analyses focusing on 
parallel trends, we specifically examine (and find no evidence of) a relative increase in foreign 
investment for the cross-listed stocks prior to the adoption of the MMoU (see Section 4.2 for 
further details). 
3.3 Regression Model  
Our primary regression analysis examines changes in foreign mutual fund investment in 
US-cross-listed firms following the signing of the MMoU in a firm’s home country. To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in economic factors in an investee country at a given point in time, we 
use non-US-cross-listed firms as a benchmark. As a result, our tests focus on changes in investor 
preferences for cross-listed stocks in a given country relative to their overall preferences for stocks 
from that country. Specifically, we construct our measure of foreign investment, 
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt, by aggregating, for each quarter and fund-country/firm-country 
pair, the ratio of investment in US-cross-listed firms to total investment—that is, for firm n, fund 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217447 
 
	
15 
m, firm-country i, fund-country j, quarter t, and all firms that are cross-listed in the US Ut.13 
 !"#$"%&'()*+,&"-.%/",&0"%&123 = 	100	× 19:;<3=;93>?@?∈B	∩	?∈D@	>∈E 19:;<3=;93>?@?∈B	>∈E   (1) 
To estimate the effect of the MMoU signing, we employ the following regression model 
using OLS: 
 !"#$"%&'()*+,&"-.%/",&0"%&123 = 	FG!H,&IIH'13 +	FK!"#$"%&'()*+,&"-IL#M"&$LN13																																																																								+	O12 + P23 + Q123	   (2) 
The dependent variable, PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt, is aggregated to the fund-country, firm-
country pair in each quarter, effectively creating a measure of the country-specific investment for 
a value-weighted fund of funds from a given investor country. For countries with fewer funds, this 
estimate will be noisier, so to account for this heterogeneity in reliability, we weight observations 
by the number of funds in a given country in our regression estimation.  
Our primary variable of interest, PostMMoUit, is an indicator that equals one if country i 
signed the MMoU before quarter t, zero if country i had not applied to sign the MMoU before 
quarter t, and missing if quarter t is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU and the date 
of signing.14 We expect a positive coefficient on PostMMoUit, which indicates that foreign 
institutions tilted their ownership toward treated (US-cross-listed) firms relative to control firms 
in the same country following the MMoU signing. 
PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit is the aggregate market capitalization of all US-cross-listed 
																																								 																				
13 For instance, our measure captures the total holdings of French mutual funds in German companies with U.S. ADRs 
as a proportion of the total investment of French mutual funds in all German companies in a given quarter. 
14 We exclude the period between a country’s application date and its signing date (two years on average) because it 
represents a transition period when the laws to facilitate information sharing may be in place, but when the 
administrative approvals are not yet complete, it is unclear how investors will respond. Results are robust to inclusion 
of that period. 
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firms in country i in quarter t, divided by the aggregate market capitalization of all firms in country 
i in quarter t. This variable controls for changes in the dependent variable that arise because of 
shifts in the market capitalization of available US cross-listed shares relative to the total investable 
shares in a country (e.g., because of new US cross-listings or because of changes in the market 
value of existing US cross-listings). βij is a time-invariant fixed effect for each fund-country/firm-
country pair, included to control for any static factors that affect the level of investment between 
country pairs (e.g., common currency). γjt is a time-varying fixed effect for each fund country 
controlling for time-varying preferences of funds from a particular country for cross-listed stocks 
(in general). To account for correlation in the level of ownership over time, we cluster standard 
errors by firm country and fund country.  
3.4  Sample data 
Our ownership data are from FactSet, which provides disaggregated security-level 
holdings at the fund level for mutual funds from a wide range of countries. In each fund report, 
FactSet provides details on the fund’s investment portfolio. We use these data to construct fund-
firm equity holdings by calendar quarter and aggregate these holdings as needed for each analysis. 
We exclude funds classified as index or closed-end because these managers’ discretionary 
investment choices are constrained. For an investee country to be included in the sample we require 
at least 10 cross-listed firms from that country, leading to a final sample of funds from 65 investor 
countries in firms from 28 investee countries.  
Table 1 Panel A reports the largest 30 of the 65 investor countries (the remaining 35 
countries represent 1,232 funds). About 22.8% of the funds are headquartered in the US with the 
remainder spread fairly evenly across a range of countries. All 28 investee countries included in 
the sample are reported in Table 1 Panel B, which reports the total amount of foreign investment 
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in each country and the amount of investment in cross-listed firms from that country.15 Among the 
investee countries, the UK attracts the most fund investment, but investment is spread across a 
wide range of countries. We designate any firm domiciled outside the US but with shares traded 
in the US as “cross-listed.” The fraction of investment in cross-listed firms in a given target country 
as a percentage of all investment in that country is typically in excess of 50%, which (although not 
controlling for other factors such as firm size) is consistent with prior research indicating 
institutional investors’ preference for US-cross-listed firms (Ferreira and Matos 2008). Overall, 
the sample comprises about $2.4 trillion of total investment. 
Table 1 Panel B also reports the date that a country signs the MMoU, committing to 
cooperation with the SEC and other regulators. As is evident in the table, the MMoU signature 
dates are spread over time with no clear divisions between emerging and developed markets. 
Rather, the variation in adoption timing is likely attributable to differences across countries in their 
existing laws, which dictate the legislative process and scope of enacting new laws necessary to 
join the MMoU and the development of the required infrastructure to facilitate information 
sharing. The staggered adoption helps with identification by allowing us to control for shocks to 
preferences for US cross-listed stocks that are common across countries/investors in any given 
quarter so that we can identify the incremental effect of the MMOU.  
In Table 2, we report descriptive statistics and correlations for our sample.16 The sample is 
fairly well-balanced across the pre- and post-MMoU periods, with 68% of the observations in the 
post-MMoU period. The cross-sectional variables presented are on a country level (either firm 
country, fund country, or firm country-fund country pair); in some analyses the investment 
																																								 																				
15 The US is excluded as an investee country because, by definition, US cross-listed firms cannot be domiciled in the 
US. 
16 HighDistrust is based on a Eurobarometer survey of residents of Western European countries. None of the surveyed 
countries was a former communist nation, so the pairwise correlation between these two variables is undefined.  
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aggregations are based on partitioning variables such as fund turnover, which are not included in 
Panels A and B.  
4. The Effect of the MMoU on Foreign Portfolio Investment 
4.1 The Overall Effect of the MMoU on Investment in US-Cross-Listed Firms  
Our initial tests of the effect of the MMoU on overall institutional investment are presented 
in Table 3. The coefficient of interest, PostMMoU, captures the change in holdings of US-cross-
listed stocks (relative to non-cross-listed stocks) for fund country j following the MMoU. 
Consistent with SEC oversight increasing investor demand for US cross-listed stocks, the positive 
coefficient estimate for PostMMoU reported in Column (1) indicates that investors’ tilt their 
portfolios, in terms of the relative dollar value of their investment, toward US-cross-listed firms 
after the investee country signs the MMoU. Given that the dependent variable captures the 
investment of funds from a given country in US-cross-listed firms relative to their overall 
investment in the investee country, the coefficient estimate indicates that, on average, fund 
managers’ increased their holdings of US-cross-listed firms by about 5.4 percentage points relative 
to their total holdings following the signing of the MMoU. The mean of the dependent variable is 
about 65.3 percentage points—showing that 65 cents of each dollar of cross-border investment is 
allocated to US-cross-listed firms. The 5.4 percentage point increase equates to a tilt toward US-
cross-listed firms of almost 10 percent compared to the pre-MMoU period. Relative to the 
aggregate investment of $2.2 trillion, the coefficient implies an aggregate shift of about $121 
billion toward cross-listed firms following the MMoU signings. 
One potential concern with this analysis is that it might reflect a response to changes in 
profitability, capital structure or liquidity for cross-listed stocks following the MMoU. Later, we 
provide evidence that the increased investment is not concentrated in institutions that are likely to 
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be most sensitive to trading costs (e.g., results are stronger for dedicated than transitory 
institutions), suggesting that the results are not driven by liquidity changes. However, to more 
directly address the possibility that the results reflect changes in factors such as profitability, 
liquidity and capital structure around the MMoU signing, Column (2) replicates the analysis 
controlling for the ratios of liquidity, profitability and leverage for the US-cross-listed stocks 
relative to non-cross-listed stocks. The results remain very similar when controlling for 
profitability, leverage, and liquidity.  
As an alternative specification, we consider whether institutions increased the number of 
US-cross-listed stocks they held following the MMoU signing (i.e., the extensive margin). If, for 
example, the MMoU increased investor confidence in US-cross-listed stocks, we would expect 
institutions to open new positions in cross-listed stocks previously not held. This approach also 
increases confidence that our main results are not sensitive to how we measure the percentage of 
ownership.17 Here, our dependent variable is based on the number of US-cross-listed firms in 
which funds from a given country invest, scaled by the total number of investee-country firms in 
which funds from that investor country invest. Our time-varying control variable is calculated 
analogously. Results in Column (3) yield very similar inferences with similar magnitudes to those 
in Column (1): the number of funds that invest in US-cross-listed firms in the MMoU signing 
country increases by 6.9 percentage points relative to non-US-cross-listed firms following the 
signing of the MMoU, suggesting that much of the shift is on the extensive margin. Results 
(untabulated) are very similar when we control for profitability, leverage and liquidity changes 
around the MMoU, analogous to the approach in Column (2). In particular, the PostMMoU 
																																								 																				
17 For example, our primary dependent variable could vary based on share price movements in portfolio stocks. While 
that should be controlled by inclusion of PercentUSXlistedMarketcapijt in the regression, estimating the relation based 
on the number of US-cross-listed stocks held ensures that results are not sensitive to this design choice.  
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coefficient is 6.9 and is statistically significant when including a control for zero-return days, 
leverage and liquidity.  
Overall, our evidence in this section suggests that the signing of the MMoU significantly 
increases both the number of positions held and total investment in cross-listed firms relative to 
non-cross-listed firms. Based on revealed preferences by institutional investors, it appears that the 
MMoU signing increased the relative attractiveness of cross-listed shares in MMoU countries, 
resulting in substantial shifts in investment.  
4.2 Assessing Identification Assumptions  
An assumption underlying our difference-in-differences analysis is that the effect we 
document does not reflect a prior trend in favor of US cross-listing for the MMoU countries relative 
to the control countries. The fact that MMoU adoption dates are staggered and that we include 
Time × Fund Country fixed effects should control for general trends by foreign investors toward 
US-cross-listed stocks that are common to all firm countries (regardless of whether they are 
MMoU signatories) over time. However, it is still possible that for the MMoU countries, there 
were pre-existing trends that were not shared by the control countries. To assess that possibility, 
we replace the single PostMMoU indicator in Equation (2) with separate interactions between the 
MMoU-signature-country indicator and indicators for each six months in event time relative to the 
MMoU application dates. We exclude the indicator for the six-month period prior to the MMoU 
application (t-1), making this the benchmark period.  
Figure 1 plots the coefficient estimates and confidence intervals from Equation (2) over 
time using the event-time dates. If the tilt we observe reflects a more general trend in preferences 
for US-cross-listed stocks, we should observe statistically significant F coefficients prior to the 
MMoU adoption date. As illustrated in Figure 1, none of the F	 coefficients is statistically 
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distinguishable during the pre-MMoU period and there is no evidence of a trend over time.18 While 
we cannot formally test the parallel trends assumption, Figure 1 provides no evidence of a 
violation. Rather, the first significant tilt toward cross-listed stocks is contemporaneous with the 
MMoU signing.  In the post-MMoU period, the F coefficient on PostMMoUit becomes statistically 
positive, suggesting that there was a significant shift in preferences toward US-cross-listed firms 
after the MMoU signing. We next turn to cross-sectional analyses to further understand the 
determinants of the investment changes.  
4.3 Variation in the Effect of the MMoU based on Oversight Needs of the Investor  
 We begin our cross-sectional analyses by considering whether the strength of the MMOU 
effect varies based on the informational and oversight needs of investors. In particular, we expect 
that investors at a greater informational disadvantage (absent enhanced oversight) and those whose 
investment strategy is more reliant on transparency and good governance are most likely to benefit 
from the MMoU.  
4.3.1 Informational Asymmetry Between Foreign vs. Local Investors 
 The level of informational asymmetry likely differs among investors depending on whether 
they are foreign or local. The home bias literature suggests that foreign investors are generally at 
an informational disadvantage relative to local investors (e.g., Choe et al. 2005). Given that local 
investors have advantages in terms of familiarity with domestic firms, access to information, and 
proximity to monitor local firms, greater SEC oversight should be less important. If foreign 
investors value the oversight associated with the MMoU more than local investors, we expect the 
ownership effect to be more pronounced for foreign institutions. In the extreme, local investors 
might even reduce their holdings in US-cross-listed stocks following the MMoU signing because 
																																								 																				
18 The absence of a trend also reduces the concern that the MMoU signing was in response to increased interest in US-
cross-listed shares by foreign investors prior to the MMoU (i.e., reverse causality). 
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the decline in their relative information advantage creates a preference for non-cross-listed shares 
with relatively less oversight. If foreign investors’ value increased oversight more than local 
investors, the relative increase in demand for shares by foreign investors will induce selling by 
local investors who place relatively less value on the oversight.19 As a result, we predict a positive 
response to the MMoU for foreign institutions and a smaller (and potentially negative) response 
for local institutions. 
To examine this question, we partition our sample based on whether the investor is 
domiciled in the same country (i.e., a local investor) or a different country (i.e., a foreign investor) 
as the investee firm. Table 4 reports the results. In Column (1), the estimate for the effect of the 
MMoU on local investors is negative (-2.7%) but not statistically significant, providing no 
evidence that domestic funds tilted their portfolios toward US cross-listed firms following the 
signing of the MMoU. In Column (2), the positive and significant coefficient estimate (5.6%) 
indicates that foreign investors tilted their portfolios more toward US cross-listed stocks following 
the MMoU. The economic magnitude of the difference in portfolio tilts of the local and foreign 
investors is large (8.3%) and statistically significant, suggesting that local institutional investors 
appear to value the increase in MMoU oversight less. The lack of a positive effect for local 
investors also provides further assurance that our results do not reflect a more general increase in 
the preference of institutional investors for US-cross-listed stocks.  
4.3.2 Variation in the Effect of the MMoU between US and non-US Foreign Institutions  
While foreign institutions, in general, stand to benefit from the enhanced regulatory 
oversight associated with the MMoU (and the SEC’s primary mandate is with respect to US 
investors), there are reasons to expect that the benefits may actually be larger for non-US investors. 
																																								 																				
19 Given a fixed number of shares, if foreign institutions as a group are buying, others must be selling. The sellers 
could be local institutions, individual investors, or foreign institutions that are not included in FactSet. 
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First, prior literature suggests that US institutional investors have informational advantages 
relative to other foreign institutions because their substantial research capacity and location permit 
them to exploit a richer set of global private information (e.g., Albuquerque et al. 2009; Ferreira 
et al. 2017). In addition, by virtue of their location, resources, and scale, US institutions are likely 
better able to assert their private legal right of action and governance preferences, even absent the 
MMoU (Fang et al. 2015). Because US institutions are more likely to hold cross-listed shares in 
the US, they will have stronger legal protection even absent the MMoU.  To the extent that the 
primary benefit of the MMoU accrues to non-US investors, it suggests a significant regulatory 
spillover effect of SEC oversight to non-US investors. 
To examine the spillover effect of SEC oversight to non-US investors, we split our sample 
between non-US and US investors.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report results for US-foreign 
and non-US-foreign investors, respectively. In Column (1), the estimate for the incremental effect 
of the MMoU on US-foreign investors is positive (2.4%) but statistically insignificant. In Column 
(2), the positive and significant coefficient estimate of 6.8% suggests that the MMoU effect was 
stronger for non-US foreign investors. The difference in the magnitude of the MMoU effect 
between non-US-foreign versus US-foreign investors (4.4%) is statistically and economically 
significant. These results are consistent with a spillover effect of regulation, with non-US investors 
placing the greatest value on the increased US oversight and cross-border regulation associated 
with the MMoU signing. 
4.3.2.1 Effect of Morrison on non-US Foreign Institutions  
The preceding results provide evidence that the effect of the MMoU was larger for non-
US institutions. To provide more direct evidence, we exploit a shock to legal standing associated 
with the Supreme Court ruling in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case (Morrison) in the 
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second quarter of 2010, which clarified that US legal protections do not apply to investors trading 
foreign stocks on foreign exchanges. The most significant effect of Morrison was to limit the 
ability of non-US investors to pursue securities litigation in US courts for transactions on non-US 
exchanges (even for cross-listed firms). As a result, following Morrison, we expect the additional 
oversight associated with the MMoU to be even more important for non-US investors given their 
loss of private legal standing in US courts—effectively a substitution between public and private 
enforcement. 
To examine the effects of Morrison, we re-estimate the regression from Table 5, Column 
(2) for non-US institutions and include an interaction between the PostMMoU indicator and a 
PostMorrison indicator that takes a value of one after the second quarter of 2010. If the importance 
of SEC oversight with the MMoU increased after Morrison, we expect a significant positive 
coefficient on the interaction. Results reported in Table 5, Column (3) are consistent with this 
prediction. In particular, the coefficient on the post-Morrison MMoU variable is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that after Morrison limited foreign investors’ rights to private 
litigation, the oversight associated with the MMoU became more important. 
Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest that the primary beneficiaries of the MMoU 
(at least in terms of ownership preferences and trading behavior) are non-US foreign investors. 
Together with the evidence on the importance of SEC involvement, the fact that non-US foreign 
investors appear to be primary beneficiaries suggests a spillover of increased SEC oversight to 
non-US foreign investors. Furthermore, these results suggest that an increase in public 
enforcement, such as the signing of the MMoU, serves as a substitute for the private right to legal 
redress; when the private right to litigation was reduced for foreign investors following Morrison, 
public enforcement became more important. While the trade-off between public enforcement and 
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private litigation is likely to be important in a wide range of settings, ours is (to our knowledge) 
the first empirical evidence of such a relationship in the context of the securities markets. 
4.3.3  Information Asymmetry between the Fund and Firm Country  
 The results in the previous section indicate that the adoption of the MMoU had a 
particularly pronounced effect for non-US foreign investors, who are more likely to be at an 
informational disadvantage relative to local investors. The extent of this informational 
disadvantage likely differs by specific investor-investee country pair. We proxy for the extent of 
the information asymmetry and the costs of monitoring for non-US foreign investors based on 
whether the investor-investee country pair (1) is not geographically contiguous, (2) does not share 
a common language, (3) has no preexisting colonial relationship, and (4) is characterized by a high 
level of distrust—measures of information asymmetry commonly used in the prior literature.20 For 
example, sharing the same language or legal origin makes it easier to monitor a firm because the 
direct cost of accessing and processing information is likely lower and the familiarity with the 
legal system is likely higher. Similarly, countries with the same language and legal origin are more 
likely to share cultural norms and expectations. Investors from countries that are separated by a 
lack of trust, as measured by the Eurobarometer trust indices for pairs of countries (Guiso, et al. 
2009), are likely to place additional importance on the external oversight provided by the MMoU.  
Results reported in Table 6 support the prediction that the effect of the MMoU is largest 
for investor countries where information asymmetries are likely to be largest. In particular, the 
difference in coefficient estimates for Contiguous, reported across Columns (1) and (2), is 8.15 
and statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of the MMoU is more pronounced when the 
																																								 																				
20 For instance, Carlin et al. (2009), models the relation between regulation and trust in financial markets and shows 
that the two tend to be substitutes. Consistent with this, Pinotti (2008) and Aghion et al. (2010) find that individuals 
prefer state control when trust is low.  
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investor and target countries are geographically separated. Similarly, the difference in coefficients 
for Common Language, reported in Columns (3) and (4), is 6.97 and statistically significant, 
indicating that for countries that do not share a common language, the response to the MMoU is 
larger. The difference in coefficients for a historic Colonial Relationship, reported in Columns (5) 
and (6), is 5.24 and statistically significant, indicating that the effect of the MMoU is smaller if a 
fund-firm pair has a colonial relationship. Finally, the difference in coefficients for High Distrust 
is 12.3 and statistically significant, suggesting that the oversight associated with the MMoU is 
substantially larger when there is a high level of distrust between the investor and target country.  
4.3.4  Fund Strategy 
The preceding analysis suggests that the effect of the MMoU differs based on the inherent 
informational asymmetry between the investor fund and the target company. In addition, there is 
likely variation in the importance of oversight and, hence, the response to the MMoU, based on 
fund strategies. While we exclude index funds in all of our analyses because they have little 
discretion in portfolio allocation, there is still likely variation in strategy for non-index funds. 
Following papers such as Bushee (1998, 2001) and Borochin and Yang (2017), we split investors 
into two groups based on trading behavior: (1) transient investors and (2) dedicated investors. In 
general, transient investors tend to trade frequently and hold a large number of smaller positions, 
while dedicated investors trade less frequently and hold a smaller number of larger positions.  
Borochin and Yang (2017) provide evidence that dedicated institutions tend to place a 
higher value on transparency and oversight because they invest based on firm-specific fundamental 
information with a focus on holding the stock for long-term growth, while transient institutions 
are more likely to be technical investors who trade based on short-term price movements and 
arbitrage. As a result, we expect dedicated institutions to respond more to the MMoU both because 
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they tend to be fundamentals-based investors who depend on reliable public information, and 
because they hold for long-term returns and value strong governance facilitated by better oversight.  
We split funds into transient (Low Turnover Funds) and dedicated (High Turnover Funds) 
based on the turnover classifications in FactSet and separately estimate Eq. (2) for each fund type.21 
The results in Table 7 provide support for the prediction that the MMoU has a greater impact on 
dedicated investors than it does on transient investors. The dedicated investors demonstrate a 
significant shift towards US cross-listed firms after the MMoU signing, whereas the shift for 
transient investors is insignificant.  Additionally, the difference in effect magnitude (3.9 percentage 
points) is statistically significant, consistent with dedicated investors benefitting most from the 
increased transparency and improved governance associated with the MMoU. 
4.4 Effect of SEC Involvement in the MMoU 
We next turn to examining the role of the US in the MMoU. Though over one hundred 
countries eventually signed, the US was one of the first signatories, is generally held to be a 
particularly aggressive regulator, and has been active in filing requests for regulatory cooperation. 
As a result, we expect the presence of the SEC to have a large influence on the MMoU effect. 
Accordingly, we examine whether the MMoU’s asset reallocation effect is larger based on: (1) the 
cross-listed security’s listing status with the SEC, (2) the investee country’s pre-MMoU regulatory 
links to the US, and (3) the investor country’s likely level of alignment with US institutions and 
policies.  
4.4.1 Firm Listing Status  
																																								 																				
21 Transitory funds are those with “high” or “very high” turnover while dedicated funds are those with “medium,” 
“low,” or “very low” turnover. The number of observations in this analysis is less than double that in the prior analyses 
because each fund country does not always have both transitory and dedicated funds.  
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To this point, we have focused on all US cross-listings without reference to their 
registration status with the SEC. In practice, however, the extent of SEC oversight is likely a 
function of whether the cross-listed stock is sponsored by the underlying firm and, therefore, is 
registered with the SEC. The incremental effect of the MMoU is likely to be largest for registrants 
because the SEC’s jurisdiction is clearest for those types of securities. To test this, we split our 
sample into two subsamples: (1) ADRs that are sponsored by the underlying firms and trade on an 
exchange or on the OTC, and (2) unsponsored ADR shares in the OTC markets. In the latter case, 
the ADR is typically originated by a US bank without involvement from the underlying firm and 
the SEC’s oversight mandate is limited. We expect more SEC involvement for sponsored ADRs 
and, thus, a more pronounced oversight effect associated with the MMoU.22  
Results in Table 8 are consistent with that prediction. Registrant ADR firms experience 
significant increases in foreign ownership following the MMoU signing, while non-registrant 
ADR firms do not. These results suggest that the level of involvement of the SEC relative to the 
cross-listed firm is important to foreign investors when shifting their portfolio allocation in 
response to the MMoU.23 
4.4.2 Preexisting Ties between the US and the MMoU-Adopting Country 
  The incremental SEC oversight associated with the MMoU is also likely to vary based on 
the investee country’s pre-MMoU ties to the US in general and the SEC in particular. We predict 
that the change in ownership will be smaller for signatory countries that had strong economic ties 
																																								 																				
22 For ease of exposition, we refer to sponsored ADRs and direct dual listings as “registrants” and unsponsored ADRs 
as “non-registrants.”  
23 An alternate approach to assess SEC oversight would be to compare the MMoU effects of firms cross-listed in the 
US with those cross-listed on other markets. In practice, the extent of foreign institutional holdings in non-US cross-
listed stocks tends to be very low. While we find that the MMoU effect is insignificant for stocks cross-listed on other 
markets, the tests are too weak to provide reliable inference.  
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to the US prior to the MMoU and for which the SEC already has a formal right to support from 
home regulators. 
To test this prediction, we first estimate our regression model on two subsamples: 
observations where the firm country had SEC activity prior to the MMoU, and those where there 
was no SEC activity.  We define SEC activity as the firm country having a bilateral relationship 
with the investee country and pursuing an enforcement action against a firm in that country prior 
to the MMoU signing. We predict that the incremental effect of the MMoU signing will be smaller 
for countries with strong SEC regulatory ties to the US prior to the MMoU.24 We construct a 
second, more general, measure of the investee country’s connection to the US, 
USTradeImportancei, based on the intensity of trading between the two countries to capture 
general preexisting economic and regulatory links (e.g., tax and trade policy and financial and 
security cooperation). For each country, i, we take exports to each other country and scale by the 
export destination’s GDP to control for the size of the overall economy. We then percentile rank 
export destinations for each country i by the scaled exports with the most important partner ranked 
99. Our measure of US trade importance for each country i is the percentile rank of the US as an 
export destination for country i.25 We re-center this ranking so the mean observation (rank 65) 
equals 0 for interpretability. 
Results reported in Table 9 provide evidence that, as predicted, the effect of the MMoU on 
foreign investment is substantially larger for countries with weaker pre-existing SEC oversight 
and economic links to the US. In terms of SEC oversight, results in Columns (1) and (2) indicate 
																																								 																				
24 While the effectiveness of prior bilateral arrangements is unclear from a large-sample empirical perspective, there 
are anecdotal examples of these arrangements helping to facilitate investigations and enforcement cases (Silvers 
2017a). It is ultimately an empirical question whether the MMoU is a complement or substitute for these other bilateral 
arrangements. 
25	Results are almost identical using a similar measure based on imports rather than exports (untabulated).	
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that the effect of the MMoU resulted in no significant ownership shift toward US-cross-listed firms 
for countries with pre-existing SEC enforcement links relative to 10.8 percentage points for 
countries with no pre-existing links (column (2)), This difference is statistically significant. 
Similarly, results in Column (3) indicate that the MMoU effect is substantially larger for 
signatories with weaker pre-existing economic ties to the US. For a 25% increase in the percentile 
ranking of trade importance, there is a 2.7 percentage point decrease in the magnitude of the 
investment shift associated with the MMoU.  
Overall, these results provide evidence consistent with the prediction that the effect of the 
MMoU signing was stronger in cases in which pre-existing US oversight and economic ties were 
weaker, suggesting that the gains from the MMoU were most pronounced for countries that were 
historically most distant from the US regulatory apparatus. This result further supports the 
conclusion that our primary results reflect the effect of SEC oversight, and suggests substantial 
country-level variability in investors’ perceived benefits of the MMoU with smaller effects for 
established US regulatory partners.  
4.4.3 Alignment between the Investor Country and the US 
The preceding analysis suggests that the pairing between the SEC and the investee country 
has implications for the importance of MMoU oversight. It is also possible that the relationship 
between the investor country and the US has significant implications for the impact of the MMoU. 
In particular, we have presumed that the level of confidence in and awareness of SEC oversight is 
uniform across institutional investors. In practice, however, reliance on US oversight likely varies 
by investor.26  
																																								 																				
26 Willingness to rely on SEC oversight may be partially a function of perception (e.g., how aware and confident 
investors are with respect to the MMoU and likely SEC oversight) and partially a function of likely impact (e.g., 
investors’ perceptions of how likely the SEC is to prioritize their interests given the closeness of their country’s ties 
to the US).  
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Our prediction is that for investor countries with closer alignment to the US, signing the 
MMoU will have a larger impact (i.e., a greater investment tilt towards US cross-listed firms). We 
use two measures of alignment with the US: 1) similarity between the investor country and the US 
in UN General Assembly votes and 2) an indicator if the fund country has ever had a communist 
regime. Both measures are intended to capture the extent of policy and political alignment (or lack 
thereof) between the US and the investor country. We assume that countries with a high degree of 
alignment with the US on UN votes have similar political structures and are likely to be more 
closely linked and better coordinated with US government institutions such as the SEC. Given the 
historical animosity and lack of alignment between communist countries and the US, we expect 
funds from current or former communist countries to place less reliance on SEC oversight.  
We measure similarity in UN voting using percentile ranks based on the number of 
congruent votes between the fund country and the US from 1996 to 2000, with higher values 
indicating greater similarity. For ease of interpretation, we re-center the median of the percentile 
ranks to 0. Results reported in Table 10, Column (1) indicate a strong positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction between UN voting and MMoU signing, consistent with increased 
alignment with the US resulting in a stronger MMoU effect. In terms of magnitude, funds from 
the country with the most similar voting record increased their portfolio tilt toward US cross-listed 
firms by about 9.6 percentage points following the MMoU signing, while funds in countries that 
rank at the 50th percentile increased their holdings by about 5.7 percentage points. 
Results reported in Table 10, Columns (2) and (3) indicate that the effect of the MMoU 
was significantly weaker for former communist countries, potentially because they are less aware 
of and place less confidence in SEC oversight. Coupled with the results from the previous two 
sections, the evidence here suggests that the strength of the response to the MMoU signing is a 
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function of: the level of SEC oversight based on registrant status, pre-existing ties to the US by the 
investee country, and the investor country’s political alignment with the US. Overall, the results 
highlight the importance of SEC oversight to the effectiveness of the MMoU.  
4.5 Spillover Effects to Non-US Exchanges 
The preceding analyses suggest that the effect of the MMoU is most pronounced for 
investors facing high information asymmetry in situations with previously limited access to SEC 
oversight and enforcement. The fact that investors trading US cross-listed securities on US 
exchanges have preexisting legal advantages relative to those trading in the same firms on non-US 
exchanges suggests the possibility that the incremental benefits of the MMoU could be larger for 
investors trading on non-US exchanges. That is, it is possible that the benefits of SEC oversight 
have significant spillover effects to non-US exchanges because the additional oversight is at the 
firm level (irrespective of the exchange on which the stock is traded) and is non-excludable. In 
fact, to the extent that investors trading on US exchanges are better protected by the right to private 
action through the US courts absent the MMoU, the primary beneficiaries of SEC oversight 
associated with the MMoU may be non-US exchanges. To examine that possibility, we consider 
the incidence of the benefits to non-US exchanges based on the extent to which the increased 
foreign institutional holdings associated with the MMoU occurs on the domestic, relative to the 
US, exchange.  
Prior research (e.g., Halling et al. 2007) suggests that regulatory enforcement is an 
important determinant of the trading venue for cross-listed firms. For foreign investors, trading 
cross-listed shares on US exchanges has the potential advantage of stronger legal standing, but 
often carries substantial disadvantages related to currency risk, illiquidity, and trading fees. With 
the MMoU in place, however, the ability to pursue private litigation likely became less important 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217447 
 
	
33 
as a disciplining mechanism given the expanded firm-level SEC public oversight that applies 
irrespective of the trading venue.  
An advantage of the FactSet data is that we are able to observe whether the institution 
increased their position in the ADR traded in New York or in the underlying security traded in the 
home market. To the extent that the additional oversight associated with the MMoU reduced the 
relative advantage of purchasing shares on the US markets, we predict a significant increase in 
holdings on the foreign market. We examine this question by calculating for each fund-firm-
quarter the percent of investment in US-cross-listed firms that occurs on a US exchange, out of 
total investment in the firm country.  We similarly calculate a ratio for the same US-cross-listed 
firms listed, but based on the percent of investment that occurs in the home (non-US) market.  We 
regress each of these ratios on our post-MMoU indicator and a control ratio of the market 
capitalization of US exchange-listed firms from country i divided by the market capitalization of 
all firms from country i. Results reported in Table 11 are consistent with the prediction that the 
increased investment occurs primarily in the home market. In particular, Column (1) indicates that 
foreign ownership in US-cross-listed firms increased by a statistically significant 3.9 percentage 
points in the foreign market following adoption of the MMoU. On the other hand, column (2) 
indicates no significant change in the US market, and the difference in coefficients across the 
columns is significant.  
These findings are of interest for at least two reasons. First, because the results are strongest 
for investments in the primitive security and not on the US exchange, they suggest that the MMoU 
effect reflects firm-level regulatory bonding (and not some other aspect of trading on US 
exchanges). Second, these results suggest a significant spillover from US regulatory oversight that 
benefits exchanges in the signatory country. They are consistent with the preceding results in 
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suggesting that primary beneficiaries of US involvement in the MMoU appear to have been non-
US investors trading on non-US exchanges.  
5. Conclusions  
Despite the fact that multinational regulatory cooperation is becoming more prevalent, 
there is little existing empirical evidence examining the effect of changes in regulatory oversight 
on international investor clienteles or on regulatory spillovers across countries and investors. We 
use a country’s signing of the MMoU as a shock to the extent of US regulatory oversight, coupled 
with detailed data on portfolio holdings by institutional investors from a wide range of countries, 
to provide evidence on the effects of cross-border regulatory cooperation on a global institution’s 
portfolio choice. 
Focusing on firms cross-listed on US markets, our primary findings are as follows: 
1. Institutional investment increased following the MMoU signing. 
2. In terms of investor type, the effect was strongest for: 
a. foreign (as opposed to domestic) investors, 
b. non-US investors among the foreign investors, especially after the Morrison 
Supreme Court decision which confirmed that trading of foreign securities on 
foreign exchanges is not covered by US securities laws, and  
c. dedicated (as opposed to transient) investors. 
3. In terms of signatory countries, the effect was strongest for countries that had limited 
regulatory and economic ties to the US prior to the MMoU. 
4. In terms of firms, the effect was strongest for firms with greater SEC oversight (i.e., firms 
with sponsored ADRs). 
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5. In terms of investor country, the effect was strongest for countries that had traditional links 
to the US (similar voting in the UN and a noncommunist tradition). 
6. In terms of investor/investee country pairs, the effect was strongest for pairs where the 
level of information asymmetry between the investor relative to the investee was greatest, 
based on geographic distance, language, legal origin and distrust. 
7. Following the MMoU signing, ownership in cross-listed shares increased substantially in 
non-US markets. 
While our results are, to some extent, descriptive, we believe they speak to an important 
gap in the literature and are likely to be of interest to a range of constituents. First, given that the 
SEC expends significant effort coordinating with foreign regulators, it is important to understand 
what types of investors are primary beneficiaries. For example, because the SEC is a US regulator, 
it is interesting to note that the benefits associated with the MMoU appear to be primarily for non-
US investors trading on non-US exchanges. Second, the results are likely to be of interest to 
signatory countries in weighing the costs and benefits associated with the MMoU, and when 
assessing whether or not to join the upcoming Enhanced MMoU (EMMoU). Third, the findings 
provide insight to stakeholders more generally about the effectiveness of cooperative regulatory 
agreements in general and the MMoU in particular. 
Of course, our conclusions are subject to important caveats. In particular, we can only draw 
inference from the MMoUs as implemented and much of our evidence on investor, investee and 
country characteristics is cross-sectional in nature, limiting our ability to draw strong causal 
conclusions. That being said, we report a broad set of results that provide insights into regulatory 
spillovers in global markets. 
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Figure 1: Parallel Trends Event Time Analysis
This figure plots the estimated ↵ coe cients and associated 90% confidence intervals from the model:
yijt = ↵1BeyondFiveYrBeforeMMoUit + ↵2FiveYrBeforeMMoUit + ↵3FourYrBeforeMMoUit
+ ↵4ThreeYrBeforeMMoUit + ↵5TwoYrBeforeMMoUit + ↵6PostMMoU
+  PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit +  ij +  jt + "ijt
where i indexes firm country, j indexes fund country, and t indexes time (quarter and year).  ij is a time-invariant
fixed e↵ect for each fund country-firm country pair, and  jt is a time-varying fixed e↵ect for each fund country. The
dependent variable is calculated for each quarter t, as 100 ⇥ aggregate investment by funds from country j in firms
from country i that crosslist in the US divided by aggregate investment by funds from country j in firms from country
i. BeyondFiveYrBeforeMMoUit = 1 if country i applied to be a signatory to the MMoU over 5 years after quarter
t, 0 otherwise; XYrBeforeMMoUit = 1 if country i applies to be a signatory to the MMoU in the year X years after
quarter t, 0 otherwise. PostMMoUit = 1 if country i signed the MMoU before quarter t, 0 if country i had not applied
to sign the MMoU before quarter t, and missing if quarter t is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU and
the date of signing. The reference period is when t is in the year before country i’s application to be a signatory to
the MMoU. PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit is 100 ⇥ the marketcap of firms from country i in quarter t that crosslist
in the US divided by the marketcap of firms from country i. Observations are weighted by the number of funds in
country j. Standard errors are clustered by firm country and by fund country.
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Table 1: Sample Composition
Panel A presents the number of funds in the sample per fund country. We include in the sample holdings over a 14
year window (from the 3rd quarter of 2001 through the 2nd quarter of 2015). The top 30 fund countries, measured by
fund counts, are tabulated. The entire sample contains 46,372 funds across 65 fund countries (smaller fund countries
are included in the sample but not tabulated for brevity). Panel B shows the dollars invested in stocks in a firm
country by sample funds, averaged by reporting quarter. For an investee country to be included in the sample, the
country must have at least 10 firms cross-listed in the US (in which funds are investing) in each quarter.
Panel A: Fund Countries
Country Funds Country Funds
United States 10,612 South Africa 707
Spain 5947 Belgium 597
France 4145 Denmark 570
United Kingdom 3405 Netherlands 499
Canada 3320 China 474
Japan 2135 Finland 465
Germany 1959 Taiwan 457
Austria 1106 Liechtenstein 440
India 1099 Norway 390
Italy 1051 Chile 299
Switzerland 953 Poland 280
Israel 878 Malaysia 271
Brazil 874 Luxembourg 270
Sweden 743 Thailand 250
Australia 715 Portugal 229
Panel B: Investee Firm Countries
Country Investment ($ Bil) MMoU Country Investment ($ Bil) MMoU
Cross-listed All Signed Cross-listed All Signed
United Kingdom 313.4 417.2 10 Mar 2003 Italy 21.7 43.5 15 Sep 2003
Canada 173.9 260.1 23 Oct 2002 Ireland 38.6 42.4 24 Dec 2012
Japan 118.7 210.8 19 Feb 2008 Brazil 30.8 41.8 21 Oct 2009
France 141.3 195.2 19 Feb 2003 Taiwan 15.0 38.5 15 Mar 2011
Switzerland 110.5 144.7 15 Feb 2010 South Africa 22.0 32.4 18 Mar 2003
Germany 101.8 137.2 5 Nov 2003 Mexico 21.3 25.1 14 Mar 2003
Netherlands 85.3 99.3 22 Nov 2007 Singapore 14.8 23.0 17 Nov 2005
China 40.5 95.1 29 May 2007 Bermuda 21.5 22.7 07 Jun 2007
Sweden 39.4 63.5 17 May 2011 Russia 2.6 22.6 16 Feb 2015
Hong Kong 45.9 59.9 3 Mar 2003 Norway 12.8 21.7 11 Dec 2006
India 10.6 57.8 22 Apr 2003 Israel 11.1 12.4 2 Jul 2006
Australia 35.4 56.2 8 Oct 2002 Thailand 4.5 10.9 19 Jun 2008
South Korea 9.5 50.4 9 Jun 2010 Chile 1.8 3.0 -
Spain 32.8 47.0 24 Mar 2003 Argentina 1.1 1.1 12 Jun 2014
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Table 3: E↵ect of MMoU on Fund Investment
This table estimates regressions in the form of:
yijt = ↵1PostMMoUit +B · Controlsit +  ij +  jt + "ijt
where i indexes firm country, j indexes fund country, and t indexes time (quarter and year).  ij is a time-invariant
fixed e↵ect for each fund country-firm country pair, and  jt is a time-varying fixed e↵ect for each fund country. In
columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is calculated for each quarter t, as 100 ⇥ aggregate investment by funds
from country j in firms from country i that crosslist in the US divided by aggregate investment by funds from country
j in firms from country i. In column (3) the dependent variable is calculated for each quarter t and aggregated for
each pair of firm country i and fund country j as 100 ⇥ the count of firm-fund investment pairs where the firm
crosslists in the US divided by the count of firm-fund investment pairs. PostMMoUit = 1 if country i signed the
MMoU before quarter t, 0 if country i had not applied to sign the MMoU before quarter t, and missing if quarter t
is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU and the date of signing. PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit is 100 ⇥
the marketcap of firms from country i in quarter t that crosslist in the US divided by the marketcap of firms from
country i. PercentUSXlistedCountit is 100⇥ the number of firms from country i in quarter t that crosslist in the US
divided by the total number of firms from country i. ZeroReturnDaysRatioit is the average zero return days per firm
of all crosslisted firms from country i during quarter t, weighted by market cap, divided by the average zero return
days of all firms from country i during quarter t, also weighted by market cap. NetIncomeRatioit is the net income
divided by total assets from crosslisted firms in country i scaled by net income over total assets from all firms in
country i, with both the numerator and denominator weighted by market cap. LeverageRatioit is the debt to asset
ratios, weighted by market cap, of crosslisted firms from country i scaled by all firms in country i. Observations are
weighted by the number of funds in country j. Standard errors are clustered by firm country and by fund country.
Investment Counts
(1) (2) (3)
PostMMoU 5.425⇤⇤ 5.533⇤⇤ 6.880⇤⇤⇤
(2.671) (2.600) (2.590)
PercentUSXlistedMarketCap 0.902⇤⇤⇤ 0.922⇤⇤⇤
(0.084) (0.085)
PercentUSXlistedCount 0.931⇤⇤⇤
(0.158)
ZeroReturnDaysRatio 0.003
(3.377)
NetIncomeRatio  0.013
(0.090)
LeverageRatio  2.368
(3.961)
Fixed E↵ects:
Fund Country ⇥ Investee Country Yes Yes Yes
Fund Country ⇥ Quarter Yes Yes Yes
Standard Error Clusters:
Fund Country 65 65 65
Firm Country 28 28 28
N 44,893 44,893 44,893
Adjusted R2 0.767 0.767 0.794
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Spillovers to Foreign Funds
This table estimates regressions in the form of:
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt = ↵1PostMMoUit ↵2PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit +  ij +  jt + "ijt
where i indexes firm country, j indexes fund country, and t indexes time (quarter and year).  ij is a time-invariant
fixed e↵ect for each fund country-firm country pair, and  jt is a time-varying fixed e↵ect for each fund country.
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt is calculated for each quarter t, as 100 ⇥ aggregate investment by funds from country
j in firms from country i that crosslist in the US divided by aggregate investment by funds from country j in firms
from country i. PostMMoUit = 1 if country i signed the MMoU before quarter t, 0 if country i had not applied
to sign the MMoU before quarter t, and missing if quarter t is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU
and the date of signing. PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit is 100 ⇥ the marketcap of firms from country i in quarter t
that crosslist in the US divided by the marketcap of firms from country i. The sample for column (1) is observations
where i = j, whereas column (2) is observations where i 6= j. Observations are weighted by the number of funds in
country j. Standard errors are clustered at the firm country level.
Investment
(1) (2)
PostMMoU  2.698 5.580⇤⇤⇤
(4.128) (1.333)
PercentUSXlistedMarketCap 0.879⇤⇤⇤ 0.897⇤⇤⇤
(0.138) (0.042)
Sample Funds: Local Foreign
Fixed E↵ects:
Fund Country ⇥ Investee Country Yes Yes
Fund Country ⇥ Quarter Yes Yes
Standard Error Clusters:
Fund Country 27 65
N 1,026 43,867
Adjusted R2 0.897 0.765
Di↵erence in ↵1 8.278
⇤
(4.318)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Spillovers to Non-US Funds
This table estimates regressions in the form of:
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt = ↵1PostMMoUit [+ ↵2(PostMorrisont ⇥ PostMMoUit)] +
↵3PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit + Fixed E↵ects+ "ijt
where i indexes firm country, j indexes fund country, and t indexes time (quarter and year).
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt is calculated for each quarter t, as 100 ⇥ aggregate investment by funds from country
j in firms from country i that crosslist in the US divided by aggregate investment by funds from country j in firms
from country i. PostMMoUit = 1 if country i signed the MMoU before quarter t, 0 if country i had not applied to
sign the MMoU before quarter t, and missing if quarter t is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU and
the date of signing. PostMorrisont = 1 if t > the second quarter of 2010, 0 otherwise. PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit
is 100 ⇥ the marketcap of firms from country i in quarter t that crosslist in the US divided by the marketcap of
firms from country i. The sample for column (1) is observations where i 6= j and j = US; columns (2) and (3) are
observations where i 6= j and j 6= US. Observations are weighted by the number of funds in country j. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm-country level.
Investment
(1) (2) (3)
PostMMoU 2.449 6.815⇤⇤ 4.765⇤⇤
(2.962) (2.852) (2.326)
PostMMoU ⇥ PostMorrison 11.242⇤⇤
(4.447)
PercentUSXlistedMarketCap 0.790⇤⇤⇤ 0.944⇤⇤⇤ 0.912⇤⇤⇤
(0.080) (0.085) (0.080)
Sample Funds: US Foreign Non-US Foreign Non-US Foreign
Fixed E↵ects:
Investee Country Yes No No
Fund Country ⇥ Investee Country No Yes Yes
Quarter Yes No No
Fund Country ⇥ Quarter No Yes Yes
Standard Error Clusters:
Firm Country 28 28 28
N 1,507 42,360 42,360
Adjusted R2 0.902 0.726 0.730
Di↵erence in ↵1 4.366
⇤⇤⇤
(1.638)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Fund-specific Information Use
This table estimates regressions in the form of:
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt = ↵1PostMMoUit + ↵2PercentUSXlistedit +  ij +  jt + "ijt
where i indexes firm country, j indexes fund country, and t indexes time (quarter and year).  ij is a time-invariant
fixed e↵ect for each fund country-firm country pair, and  jt is a time-varying fixed e↵ect for each fund country. The
dependent variable is calculated as 100 ⇥ investment by country j’s funds in crosslisted companies scaled by all
investment from country j’s funds in country i stocks. PercentUSXlistedit is calculated analogously to the dependent
variable in each column, but uses market capitalization rather than fund investment in calculating the numerator and
denominator. PostMMoUit = 1 if country i signed the MMoU before quarter t, 0 if country i had not applied to sign
the MMoU before quarter t, and missing if quarter t is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU and the
date of signing. In each column the sample consists of non-US foreign (to the investee country) funds. Column (1)
resricts the sample to the funds FactSet characterizes “Medium,” “Low,” or “Very Low” turnover, and Column (2)
restricted to “High” and “Very High” turnover funds. Observations are weighted by the number of funds in country
j. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and fund country levels.
Investment
(1) (2)
PostMMoU 6.960⇤⇤⇤ 3.104
(2.561) (2.172)
PercentUSXlistedMarketCap 0.955⇤⇤⇤ 0.959⇤⇤⇤
(0.080) (0.093)
Sample Funds: Low Turnover High Turnover
Fixed E↵ects:
Fund Country ⇥ Investee Country Yes Yes
Fund Country ⇥ Quarter Yes Yes
Standard Error Clusters:
Fund Country 63 51
Firm Country 28 28
N 42,245 28,812
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.585
Di↵erence in ↵1 3.856
⇤⇤⇤
(1.086)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Type of US Crosslisting
This table estimates regressions in the form of:
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt = ↵1PostMMoUit + ↵2PercentUSXlistedit +  ij +  jt + "ijt
where i indexes firm country, j indexes fund country, and t indexes time (quarter and year).  ij is a time-invariant
fixed e↵ect for each fund country-firm country pair, and  jt is a time-varying fixed e↵ect for each fund country.
In column (1), the dependent variable is calculated as 100 ⇥ investment by country j’s funds in companies that
directly list on a US exchange or have a sponsored ADR scaled by all investment from country j’s funds in country i
stocks. In column (2), the numerator of the dependent variable is investment in firms that have an unsponsored ADR.
PercentUSXlistedit is calculated analogously to the dependent variable in each column, but uses market capitalization
rather than fund investment in calculating the numerator and denominator. PostMMoUit = 1 if country i signed the
MMoU before quarter t, 0 if country i had not applied to sign the MMoU before quarter t, and missing if quarter
t is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU and the date of signing. In each column the sample consists
of non-US foreign (to the investee country) funds. Observations are weighted by the number of funds in country j.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm and fund country levels.
Investment
(1) (2)
PostMMoU 10.687⇤⇤⇤ 0.574
(2.695) (1.273)
PercentUSXlistedMarketCap 0.752⇤⇤⇤ 0.838⇤⇤⇤
(0.076) (0.082)
Investment Firms: Registrants Non-registrants
Fixed E↵ects:
Fund Country ⇥ Investee Country Yes Yes
Fund Country ⇥ Quarter Yes Yes
Standard Error Clusters:
Fund Country 60 56
Firm Country 28 21
N 38,030 20,285
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.750
Di↵erence in ↵1 10.113
⇤⇤⇤
(2.909)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Investee Country Ties to the US
This table estimates regressions in the form of:
yijt = ↵1PostMMoUit[+↵2(USTradeImportancei ⇥ PostMMoUit)] + ↵3PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit +  ij +  jt + "ijt
where i indexes firm country, j indexes fund country, and t indexes time (quarter and year).  ij is a time-invariant
fixed e↵ect for each fund country-firm country pair, and  jt is a time-varying fixed e↵ect for each fund country.
The dependent variable is calculated for each quarter t, as 100 ⇥ aggregate investment by funds from country j in
firms from country i that crosslist in the US divided by aggregate investment by funds from country j in firms from
country i. PostMMoUit = 1 if country i signed the MMoU before quarter t, 0 if country i had not applied to sign the
MMoU before quarter t, and missing if quarter t is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU and the date
of signing. PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit is 100 ⇥ the marketcap of firms from country i in quarter t that crosslist in
the US divided by the marketcap of firms from country i. USTradeImportancei is calculated for the year 2000, the
importance of exports from country i to the US. This variable is measured by percentile ranking export destinations
from country i by export value scaled by counterparty GDP, centered so the mean (rank 65) equals 0. Columns
(1) and (2) partition the sample of non-US foreign fund investment by whether or not the firm country had SEC
activity prior to the MMoU. SEC activity in the firm country before the MMoU is defined as firm countries that had
a bilateral cooperative agreement with the SEC in place and the SEC pursued an enforcement action against a firm
from country i prior to i signing the MMoU. The sample for column (3) consists of all foreign investment (to the
investee country) by non-US foreign funds. Observations are weighted by the number of funds in country j. Standard
errors are clustered by firm country and by fund country.
Investment
(1) (2) (3)
PostMMoU  1.305 10.753⇤⇤⇤ 7.708⇤⇤⇤
(2.300) (2.879) (2.583)
PostMMoU ⇥ USTradeImportance  0.108⇤
(0.059)
PercentUSXlistedMarketCap 0.916⇤⇤⇤ 0.971⇤⇤⇤ 1.275⇤⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.089) (0.263)
PercentUSXlisted ⇥ USTradeImportance  0.006
(0.004)
SEC Activity in Firm Country Before MMoU: Yes No Both
Fixed E↵ects:
Fund Country ⇥ Investee Country Yes Yes Yes
Fund Country ⇥ Quarter Yes Yes Yes
Standard Error Clusters:
Fund Country 63 60 64
Firm Country 11 17 27
N 17,906 24,454 41,409
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.745 0.729
Di↵erence in ↵1 12.058
⇤⇤⇤
(3.176)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Fund Trust in US Institutions
This table estimates regressions in the form of:
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt = ↵1PostMMoUit
[ + ↵2(PostMMoUit ⇥ USVotingSimilarityi)]
+ ↵3PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit
[ + ↵4(PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit ⇥ USVotingSimilarityi)] + ij +  jt + "ijt
where i indexes firm country, j indexes fund country, and t indexes time (quarter and year).
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentijt is calculated for each quarter t, as 100 ⇥ aggregate investment by funds from country
j in firms from country i that crosslist in the US divided by aggregate investment by funds from country j in firms
from country i. PostMMoUit = 1 if country i signed the MMoU before quarter t, 0 if country i had not applied
to sign the MMoU before quarter t, and missing if quarter t is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU
and the date of signing. PercentUSXlistedMarketcapit is 100 ⇥ the marketcap of firms from country i in quarter
t that crosslist in the US divided by the marketcap of firms from country i. USVotingSimilarityj is the percentile
rank ordered similarity of country j’s voting in the UN General Assembly to the US’s votes, centered at 0. The
sample for column (1) is all foreign investment by non-US funds. In columns (2) and (3), the sample of all foreign
investment by non-US funds is partitioned by whether or not the fund country ever operated under a Communist
regime. Observations are weighted by the number of funds in country j. Standard errors are clustered by fund and
firm countries.
Investment
(1) (2) (3)
PostMMoU 5.651⇤⇤ 6.879⇤⇤⇤ 0.091
(2.291) (2.558) (3.148)
PostMMoU ⇥ USVotingSimilarity 0.080⇤⇤⇤
(0.030)
PercentUSXlistedMarketCap 0.945⇤⇤⇤ 0.947⇤⇤⇤ 0.620⇤⇤⇤
(0.076) (0.080) (0.086)
PercentUSXlisted ⇥ USVotingSimilarity 0.00003
(0.001)
Former Communist Fund Countries: Both No Yes
Fixed E↵ects:
Fund Country ⇥ Investee Country Yes Yes Yes
Fund Country ⇥ Quarter Yes Yes Yes
Standard Error Clusters:
Fund Country 57 51 13
Firm Country 28 28 28
N 38,397 36,089 6,271
Adjusted R2 0.724 0.730 0.630
Di↵erence in ↵1 6.788
⇤⇤⇤
(2.608)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Spillovers to Foreign Markets
This table estimates regressions in the form of:
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentLocationijt = ↵1PostMMoUit
+ ↵2PercentExchgUSXlistedMarketcapit +  ij +  jt + "ijt
where i indexes firm country, j indexes fund country, and t indexes time (quarter and year).
PercentUSXlistedInvestmentLocationijt is calculated for each quarter t, as 100 ⇥ aggregate investment by funds
from country j in the securities that trade in the US [home] market of firmss from country i that crosslist on a US
exchange by aggregate investment by non-US, foreign funds from country j in firms from country i. Column (1) is
calculated using investment on the US market whereas column (2) is calculated using investment in the home market.
PostMMoUit = 1 if country i signed the MMoU before quarter t, 0 if country i had not applied to sign the MMoU
before quarter t, and missing if quarter t is between country i’s application to sign the MMoU and the date of signing.
PercentExchgUSXlistedMarketcapit is 100 ⇥ the marketcap of firms from country i in quarter t that crosslist on a
US exchange divided by the marketcap of firms from country i. Observations are weighted by the number of funds
in country j. Standard errors are clustered by fund and firm countries.
Investment
(1) (2)
PostMMoU 3.906⇤  2.913
(2.099) (2.315)
PercentExchgUSXlistedMarketCap 0.374⇤⇤⇤ 0.352⇤⇤⇤
(0.101) (0.121)
Investment Location: Home Market US Exchange
Fixed E↵ects:
Fund Country ⇥ Investee Country Yes Yes
Fund Country ⇥ Quarter Yes Yes
Standard Error Clusters:
Fund Country 64 64
Firm Country 28 28
N 41,181 41,181
Adjusted R2 0.692 0.808
Di↵erence in ↵1 6.819
⇤
(4.052)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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